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“La migration bouleverse les grands principes de l’État.” 
 
“Migration uproots the fundamental principles of the State.” 
 
Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017 
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1. Introduction  
 
Federica Mogherini, High Representative and Vice-President of the EU Commission, in 
November 2015 summarized the European Union’s approach to the migration management 
negotiations taking place in Valletta (Malta) between European and African leaders as: 
 
“The only way of managing this phenomenon is by doing this together, building 
cooperation and building common instruments.”1 
 
The African-European 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration consolidated migration as a 
priority for EU-African cooperation on trade, security, and development. The Summit announced 
new cooperation instruments to formally link the management of migration flows with 
development policy, in an effort to delineate a comprehensive approach to migration aimed at 
reducing irregular flows and tackling the “root causes” of displacement through development 
initiatives. Mogherini’s remarks (above) encapsulate the shift in rhetoric within EU institutions 
to discuss the European Union’s supranational approach to migration in its external relations. 
European leaders set out to establish a “more for more” approach to migration management and 
development policy issue-linkage within the EU’s growing network of partnerships with its 
neighboring countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, which include new development 
funding instruments, political platforms, and diplomatic visits. 
 
																																																								
1 EU Commission, (2015). “Federica Mogherini on Valletta: Together is the Key Word of This Summit”. 
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After the increase in the European Union’s interest in working with non-EU countries of 
migrant origin and transit to jointly tackle migration and development challenges, disagreements 
however persist with regards to the underlying premises and preliminary outcomes of the new 
issue-linkage instruments. During an interview at the Open Society Initiative for West Africa in 
Dakar (Senegal), the NGO’s staff members working on EU-Senegal cooperation were skeptical 
as to the EU’s commitment to interlacing migration management and development goals: “Our 
priorities are not the same ones.”2 
This study will examine the extent to which African and European goals diverge with 
respect to the use of migration as an instrument for development and economic growth. I use 
Senegal as a case study, which is one of the European Union’s 16 priority partner countries for 
migration management cooperation.3 I bring to bear expert interviews at EU institutions and in 
Senegalese institutions to examine the increase in the EU’s externalization of migration 
management and its linkage to development policy. 
The objectives of this investigation are the following. First, I will aim to establish to what 
extent the issue-linkage of migration and development in EU external relations is the result of 
existing EU governance structures and policy path dependence. Section A will therefore analyze 
the self-reinforcing relationship between EU supranational governance limitations and the choice 
of issue-linkage as a policy instrument for the externalization of migration management. 
Secondly, Section B and Section C will evaluate the impacts of issue-linkage on development 
cooperation and migration management. To what extent has the interlacing of EU development 
policy with migration management led to goal displacement within the two linked policy 																																																								
2 Interview, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017 
3 Sixteen non-EU partner countries of priority focus: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
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spheres? Section B will evaluate to what extent development cooperation goals have been 
displaced for the European Union and for non-EU partner countries. Section C will evaluate to 
what extent issue-linkage has led to the displacement of migration management objectives for 
the European Union and for non-EU partner countries. This research contributes to the newly 
emerging discussion on the long-term consequences of the EU’s current short-term security 
priority of reducing irregular migration. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 The Rise of Migration as a Subject of Political Contestation and as a Foreign Policy 
Priority in the European Union 
 
In conjunction with the onset of the Syrian civil war and the destabilization of Libya in 
2011, migration flows towards Europe started to increase on the Eastern Mediterranean route 
through Turkey and Greece and on the Central Mediterranean route through Libya and Italy. 
Between 2012 and 2015, EU member states collectively observed a 294.53% increase in asylum 
applications.4 Moreover, migration flows across the Mediterranean have been of mixed nature 
and include political refugees5 as well as people commonly defined as “economic migrants.” 6 
																																																								
4 Europol, (2017). Dataset: “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex”, Annual 
aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza] (accessed 18.01.2018) 
5 According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is classified as someone who “owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."  
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When considering the increase in migration flows across the Mediterranean, we must 
note that the European Union currently hosts only 6% of the world’s displaced population. The 
European migration crisis should therefore be contextualized within the global economic and 
political pressures generated by the worldwide increase in forced displacement and economic 
migration. Also, consider that migration is not a unidirectional flow towards Europe as often 
presented in these studies and in EU documents and rhetoric – it goes in all directions and occurs 
at national, regional and continental levels. Despite the comparative contextualization of the 
EU’s migration pressures, the percentage change in asylum applications and economic migration 
towards EU Member States is still generally regarded as a pertinent exogenous shock to EU 
policy-making, and will therefore be considered as such for the purposes of this study. 
Graph 1: Asylum Application in EU-28 Member States 
 
Source: Europol, Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants Dataset, 2017. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
6 The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants defines a migrant as "any person who lives temporarily 
or permanently in a country where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to 
this country."  
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In addition to the rise in asylum applications to EU Member States, the politicization of 
migration and the electoral successes of right-wing populist parties in national elections have 
rendered migration a key subject of political contestation in domestic politics, and this has 
spilled over into the EU intergovernmental arena. As an official at the DG of International 
Migration and Italians Abroad at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: “Elections are 
won and elections are lost over these issues.”7 
As migration became a salient issue of political contestation in EU member states’ 
domestic politics, the demand for a response from the European Union increased. A press 
coverage report prepared for the United Nations High Commission of Refugees confirmed that 
newspapers in continental Europe overwhelmingly reported that the European Union’s response 
to the migrant crisis was widely seen as inadequate, yet it was still considered the primary 
institution responsible for solving the crisis.8  
The divergence between electorate expectations and the EU’s response to the migrant 
crisis highlights the difficulty of achieving domestic migration reform. Three factors hinder EU 
internal reform on migration and asylum: (1) the incomplete integration of migration 
management competences at an EU supranational level, (2) the persistence of intergovernmental 
bargaining for national security interests, and (3) the politicization of migration in domestic and 
continental political discourse. Efforts to reform the Dublin Regulation and the Common 
European Asylum System so far have therefore stagnated, even while the EU’s pursuit of its 
foreign policy agenda has overall seemed to advance. In an interview at the DG for European 
Union External Relations at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when asked about Italy’s role 																																																								
7 Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG for International 
Migration and Italians Abroad, Rome, 13.07.2017 
8 Berry, M., Garcia-Blanc, I., and Moore, K. (2015). Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in 
the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries, Report prepared for the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (December 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf (accessed 01.02.2018) 
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in advancing EU migration legislation that focused on foreign policy rather than domestic reform 
for relocation9 and resettlement,10 Italian authorities answered: “The more we ask for internally, 
the more they give us externally.”11 
As domestic reform efforts continue to be a challenge for EU policy-makers, migration 
has become a key factor in structuring EU foreign relations. In 2015, with the publishing of the 
European Agenda on Migration,12 migration was permanently introduced as a stated priority in 
EU foreign policy. In a 2016 memo entitled EU Migration Policy at a Glance, the European 
External Action Service, the diplomatic service and foreign and defense ministry of the European 
Union, outlined the centralization of migration in EU foreign policy: 
“Migration management will become an important dimension in the EU’s foreign 
policies and instruments, ranging from diplomacy and Common Security and 
Defence Policy, to development and climate.”13 
 
 At the African-European Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015, cooperation instruments 
to tackle the “root causes” of migration were established. The Valletta Action Plan outlined five 
common pillars among African and European leaders to jointly tackle migration management 
																																																								
9 Relocation: the distribution among Member States of persons in clear need of international protection. 
(European Agenda on Migration, EU Commission, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52015DC0240) 
10 Resettlement: the transfer of individual displaced persons in clear need of international protection, on 
submission of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in agreement with the country of 
resettlement, from a third country to a Member State, where they will be admitted and granted the right to 
stay and any other rights comparable to those granted to a beneficiary of international protection. 
(European Agenda on Migration, EU Commission http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52015DC0240) 
11 Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG for European Union 
External Relations, Rome, 07.07.2017 
12 EU Commission, (2015). European Agenda on Migration, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf (Accessed 21.08.2017) 
13 European External Action Service, (2016). EU Migration Policy at a Glance, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/1_eu_migration_policy_at_glance_-_fact_sheet_2016.pdf (accessed 
18.01.2018) 
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and development cooperation (see associated footnote).14 Within development and migration 
issue-linkage, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was inaugurated as a financial 
instrument for the allocation of development funding to address the “root causes” of migration 
flows. Lastly, a year after the conclusion of the Valletta Summit, the EU Migration Partnership 
Framework was launched in 2016 to enhance bilateral cooperation with five African partner 
countries (Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ethiopia). The bilateral framework “proposes to 
frame the relations with partner countries through compacts, tailor-made to the specific 
circumstances of the partner countries and making full use of the broad range of policies at the 
European Union’s disposal.”15 This study examines these cooperation instruments in terms of 
their implications for development policy and migration management relations. 
In addition to the formal centralization of migration in the EU’s external relations and the 
introduction of new issue-linkage instruments, the increased salience of migration is also 
reflected in the daily operations within EU institutions, as confirmed during an interview at the 
EU Commission DG for Development and International Cooperation: 
“With the new partnership framework, [migration] became one of the central 
aspects in EU external policy and also in the development work that we are doing. 
Before it was one of many sectors. Now, it is always taken into account where a 
country stands in terms of migration management and where the EU is meeting 
that country. This is something that is now systematically looked at.”16 
 
The introduction and subsequent centralization migration in EU foreign policy and 
external relations can therefore be understood as well established.  																																																								
14 The Five Pillars of the Valletta Action Plan: 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement // 2. Legal migration and mobility // 3. 
Protection and asylum // 4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings // 5. Return, readmission and reintegration 
15 European External Action Service, (2016). EU Migration Policy at a Glance. 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/1_eu_migration_policy_at_glance_-_fact_sheet_2016.pdf 
(accessed 18.01.2018) 
16 Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
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2.2 Senegal as a Non-EU Partner Country Case Study 
 
 Within the EU’s external relations for migration management, Senegal is one the sixteen 
countries of priority focus and one of the five countries that signed the Migration Partnership 
Framework with the EU in 2016. Senegal serves as this investigation’s partner country case 
study because of its cooperation history with the EU, its heterogeneity in migration flows, and its 
recent national migration policy developments. 
 As for their cooperation history, the EU and Senegal have been working jointly on 
development policy for approximately 50 years, in what officials at the EU Delegation to 
Senegal currently consider “an excellent relationship with Senegalese authorities.”17 Specifically 
with regards to joint migration management, Senegal has a close working relationship with Spain 
and the European Union due to the 2005 surge in Senegalese migration flows towards Spain’s 
Canary Islands. The EU’s renewed interest in cooperating with Senegal for migration 
management as a result of the Libyan and Central Mediterranean crisis, but in the absence of a 
significant spike in Senegalese migration numbers (see Table 1), is noteworthy. With a budget of 
€161.8 million, Senegal is the largest beneficiary of development funding from the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Under the Migration Partnership Framework, EU funding 
finances nine development projects across Senegal ranging from employment creation and food 
security in regions of high emigration potential, to diaspora investment facilitation and the setup 
of a national biometric identification system (See Appendix A for the full list of projects, funding 
allocation, and implementation partners). 
																																																								
17 Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017 
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 Senegal is known for the heterogeneity of its migration flows. A country of migration 
origin, transit, and destination, Senegalese authorities work to tackle migration from a variety of 
perspectives and interested parties, among which the EU is also included. Beauchemin, Sakho, 
Schoumaker, and Flahaux (2014) summarize survey data collected by the MAFE project 
(Migration between Africa and Europe) and show that, between 1975 and 2008, there was 
neither an emigration surge from Senegal (despite the widespread belief in an African invasion in 
Europe in the early 2000s) nor the decline that should have been expected if restrictions had been 
effective.18 Table 1 summarizes data from the World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix for the top 
nine countries of destination for Senegalese emigration (countries are ranked based on the 2013 
data) and highlights the relative position of the top three European destinations, France, Italy, 
and Spain. While no time series data was available, the data from the 2010 and the 2013 Bilateral 
Migration Matrices are compared, showing that there was no discernable pattern in Senegalese 
emigration trends between 2010 and 2013. With its mixed nature of immigration and emigration 
flows, Senegal is therefore a provocative case study when evaluating the premises and outcomes 
of the EU’s increased action for migration management with non-EU partner countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
18 Beauchemin, C., Sakho, P., Schoumaker, B. and Flahaux, M. (2014). New Patterns of Migration 
between Senegal and Europe. MAFE Working Paper, Vol 21. https://www.imi-n.org/publications/new-
patterns-of-migration-between-senegal-and-europe (accessed 18.03.2018) 
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Table 1. Senegalese Emigration - Bilateral Estimates of Migrant Stocks in 2010 and 2013 
Destination Country 2010 - Number of Senegalese Migrants 
2013 - Number of 
Senegalese Migrants 
Difference between 2010 
and 2013 
France 91,446 115,393 Increase 
The Gambia 177,306 100,736 Decrease 
Italy 81,424 79,102 Decrease 
Spain 51,672 57,450 Increase 
Mauritania 64,557 45,775 Decrease 
Gabon 21,959 29,057 Increase 
Cote d'Ivoire 33,250 21,359 Decrease 
United States 16,745 13,173 Decrease 
Mali 11,895 12,310 Increase 
World 636,633 540,363 Decrease 
 
 Lastly, in terms of domestic migration policy and developments, the Senegalese government 
is currently strengthening its national approach to migration management. Migration is already 
incorporated in the Plan Sénégal Émergent (PES), President Macky Sall’s policy framework 
aimed at getting Senegal on the road to development by 2035.19 Senegal’s migration agenda has 
therefore taken a strong orientation towards the migration-development nexus. For example, an 
official at the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium underscored the role of Senegalese youth in the 
country’s development and the subsequent “priority of Senegalese authorities to maintain young 
people at home.”20 Furthermore, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning 
is currently heading a shared institutional effort to draft the Politique Nationale de Migration du 
Sénégal, Senegal’s national policy framework for migration management. Senegal’s domestic 
migration policy developments are relevant when evaluating its foreign policy relations, its state 
agency, and its national interests when working with the EU for migration management. Van 
Criekinge (2010) in fact argues that the EU’s need for strategic cooperation in migration 																																																								
19 Presidency of the Republic of Senegal, Plan Sénégal Émergent, http://www.presidence.sn/en/pse 
(accessed 14.03.2018) 
20 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium and the EU, Brussels, 28.06.2017 
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management has increased Senegal’s negotiation leverage to direct policies and development 
programming closer to its own national interests.21 Overall, Senegal therefore presents a case 
study for the issue-linkage migration and development in EU external relations that is 
historically, demographically, and strategically complex. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
In order to analyze EU-Senegal migration management relations, I firstly draw from EU 
external governance and policy issue-linkage literature. Secondly, the study situates EU 
migration governance within the two international relations debates on the linkage of migration 
to the policy areas of development and security: the migration-development nexus for the former, 
and the securitization of development cooperation for the latter. 
 
3.1 Issue-Linkage and EU External Governance  
 
Issue linkage characterizes the practice whereby decision-makers tie one foreign policy area 
to another.22 Poast (2013) defines issue linkage as “the simultaneous discussion of two or more 
issues for joint settlement” and “a bargaining tactic that (1) increases the probability of states 
reaching a negotiated agreement and (2) motivates states to remain committed to an agreement.” 
While issue-linkage can be used as an incentive or disincentive for cooperation and short-term 																																																								
21 Van Criekinge, T. (2010). The EU-Africa migration partnership: a case study of the EU's migration 
dialogue with Ghana and Senegal. In: EUI Migration Working Group, March 2010, European University 
Institute, Florence, Italy. 
22 Buchanan P., 2012. “Analytic Brief: Issue Linkage in Foreign Policy”, Posted in Analysis Assessment, 
Geopolitics, Politics, Rotate, Weekly Assessment, December 19th, 2012. Link: https://36th-
parallel.com/2012/12/19/analytic-brief-issue-linkage-in-foreign-policy/ (accessed 18.01.2018) 
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agreements, it also informs long-term strategy for policy formation and implementation. Issue-
linkage is often observed in security and trade: preferential trade agreements will regularly 
contain human-rights clauses (Hafner-Burton, 2005), while many security alliances are 
accompanied by trade concessions (Poast, 2013). 
The concept of issue-linkage has been introduced in EU external governance to examine the 
interdependence of policy spheres and agendas. In order to understand the choice and the use of 
issue-linkage in the EU’s external relations, we firstly consider the contrasting theories framing 
the EU’s pursuit of external governance relations. 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) conceptualize EU external governance as the expansion 
of the scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. They claim that differing theories can shed light on 
how the EU is able to expand its rules to the external environment. Institutionalist theories 
emphasize the role of policy legacies in shaping future policy, and power-based theories 
emphasize the bargaining position of the European Union within the international system and in 
relation to the partner country that it seeks to cooperate with.23  
The notion of policy legacies is central in historical institutionalism. Paul Pierson (2000) 
argues that political scientists must think critically about the role of time and history in policy 
analysis. Models of path dependency identify positive feedback loops as responsible for ensuring 
the consistency of institutional arrangements. The large set-up and fixed costs that are required 
for new policy paths, the learning and coordination effects, as well as the principle of adaptive 
expectations, all contribute to the persistency of institutional set-up and outcomes. Pierson 
therefore argues that “bounded change” takes place until shock episodes, called critical junctures, 
																																																								
23 Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009). “EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external 
governance”. Journal of European Public Policy, 16:6, 791-812, DOI: 10.1080/13501760903087696 
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are able to spur a policy break.24 North (1990) explains that while path dependence should not be 
considered as an inevitability principle, it can be used to conceptually narrow choice sets and 
link decision making over time.25 
Pierson’s path dependency framework provides a useful hook to understand how migration 
might be linked to other foreign policy areas. Migration’s new role at the forefront of EU foreign 
policy engagement in Africa and the Middle East enters a pre-existing framework of historical 
colonial legacies, development aid models within the international financial system shaped by 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and well-rooted international cooperation 
mechanisms within EU external relations. The issue-linkage of migration to other policy spheres 
would therefore be considered a path dependent insertion of migration in EU external relations. 
Power-based theories instead focus on the position of the European Union within 
international frameworks and bargaining regimes. In this view, external governance responds to 
external structures of power and interdependence. The bargaining power of the EU determines 
whether EU rules (rather than other rules) are selected, and whether these rules will be adopted 
and applied.26 On the other hand, Van Criekinge (2010) argues that the EU’s need for strategic 
cooperation in migration management has given some African governments, including Senegal, 
a new scope for influencing the EU and getting their demands met. The increased importance of 
migration in Senegal’s relations with Europe has allowed the government to use migration as a 
																																																								
24 Pierson, P. (2000). “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American 
Political Science Review, 94(2), 251-267. Doi:10.2307/2586011 
25 North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
26 Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig F., (2009). 
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negotiation “instrument” by soliciting closer cooperation in exchange for shifting policies closer 
to its own national interests.27 
Whether informed by policy legacies or induced by power, we now consider how the 
European Union has come to embrace issue-linkage as its primary approach to international 
cooperation for migration management. 
A key point of departure is that the EU cannot be considered a unitary and hierarchical actor. 
As Sandra Lavenex (2014) puts it, the EU operates as a “conglomerate of loosely coupled 
sectoral regimes” that leverage transgovernmental networks and international organizations to 
catalyze new mechanisms of regulatory extension.28   
One implication is that the EU is often compelled to resort to softer approaches that rely on 
socialization and transgovernmental networking. Issue-linkage is often applied when policy 
conditionality mechanisms are weak or absent and cannot therefore facilitate effective policy 
transfer. Lavenex (2014) shows that the EU’s leverage is reduced when it finds itself in a 
demander position. For example, the EU suffered limits to its bargaining power when negotiating 
migration policy with Morocco because it depended on non-EU partner countries for the 
implementation of migration controls. 29  When attempts to devise traditional conditionality 
strategies fail, Lavenex (2014) argues that the EU Commission turns towards socialization and 
transgovernmental networking with partner countries. Within the realm transgovernmental 
networking, issue-linkage figures as an increasingly utilized strategy.  
																																																								
27 Van Criekinge, T. (2010). The EU-Africa migration partnership: a case study of the EU's migration 
dialogue with Ghana and Senegal. In: EUI Migration Working Group, March 2010, European University 
Institute, Florence, Italy. 
28 Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. Journal of European 
Public Policy,21(6), 885-903. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.910818 
29 Wunderlich , D. (2010). Differentiation and Policy Convergence against Long Odds: Lessons from 
Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco, Mediterranean Politics, 15:2, 249-
272, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2010.485052 
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Ramona Coman (2015) points out another limitation to hierarchical EU policymaking: 
politicization. Coman argues that when politicization raises the pressure for a supranational EU 
policy response but EU member states do not delegate more hierarchical powers, the European 
Commission applies a network approach to seek new policy methods and solutions.30 When 
institutional legitimacy is questioned in times of crisis, new policy tools and modes of 
governance emerge to overcome the structural limitations of incomplete supranational authority. 
Migration policy is an example of the EU’s supranational deficiencies, since member states 
prefer to maintain sovereignty over legal migration and visa approvals. In Coman’s framework, 
the incomplete integration of migration policy sovereignty at a supranational level in a context of 
high politicization is a contributive factor to the EU Commission’s network approach to external 
negotiations, explaining the increase in the use of issue-linkage strategies. 
Thirdly, the absence of an international framework for the management of migration 
further explains the EU’s utilization of issue-linkage in external governance. Internationally, 
there is no coherent legal framework, no hard rule of law on migration, no single authoritative 
actor, but rather a patchwork of soft law developed by diverse international organizations. In 
2010, the International Labour Organization (ILO) highlighted the need for an international 
regime for migration management based on the rule of law in order to establish accountability, 
shared parameters, reporting and monitoring mechanisms.31  The ILO states “While many 
elements of migration policy will certainly remain in the domain of individual states, there is a 
clear need for more multilateral efforts in governing migration”.32 																																																								
30 Coman, R. (2015). Strengthening the Rule of Law at the Supranational Level: The Rise and 
Consolidation of a European Network. Journal of Contemporary European Studies,24(1), 171-188. 
doi:10.1080/14782804.2015.1057482 
31 International Labour Organization, (2010). International Labour Migration: A Rights-Based Approach. 
Geneva, International Labour Office. Page 193. 
32 International Labour Organization, (2010). 
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Alexander Betts (2011) defines global migration governance as a “fragmented tapestry” 
of institutions at the bilateral, regional, inter-regional, and multilateral levels. Rather than a “top-
down” multilateral framework, a variety of international organizations, states, and non-state 
actors are building a “bottom-up” global migration governance framework. 33  Within this 
tapestry, the 1951 UNHCR Convention on the Status of Refugees establishes the global refugee 
protection regime and is arguably the strongest instrument for cooperation on migration. 
Secondly, treaties promoted by the International Labor Organization underpin a range of labor 
standards regulating international labor migration. Additionally, the International Organization 
for Migration, despite not being a UN agency, has grown rapidly since the 1990s into the most 
prominent international organization dealing with migration issues. Lastly, state actors such as 
the United States, EU member states, as well as the supranational European Union often exhibit 
agenda-setting power with regards to international migration and visa policy. 
 The lack of a unitary international legal regime for migration management, alongside the 
previously discussed increase in technocratic and loosely associated methods for EU external 
governance, help illuminate why the EU has turned to issue-linkage as a strategy for managing 
the politicized issue of migration. Migration policy overlaps with trade, security and 
development policy in EU external relations. Our focus here is on the migration-development 
nexus. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
33 Betts, A. (2012). Global migration governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 2. 
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3.2 The Migration-Development Nexus  
 
 First coined in 2002, the term “migration-development nexus” explores the positive 
dimensions of linking migration and development. Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-
Pedersen (2002) argue that migration can be a “development resource” by highlighting the 
significance of remittances, labour movements, and human capital development for the domestic 
economic growth of a country of migrant origin. The authors therefore argue in favor of 
migration and development issue-linkage because migration can be utilized to catalyze 
development. Within issue-linkage, they also address the risk of policy divergence between 
migration and development: “Can long-term goals of global poverty reduction be achieved if 
short-term migration policy interests are to be met? Can partnership with developing countries be 
real if tackling illegal migration is the principal European policy goal?”34  
According to Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, cooperation efforts 
should place the human rights of individual migrants and the development of countries of 
migrant origin at the center of newly negotiated agreements. This, according to the authors, is 
essential to successfully link migration and development policy. The United Nations also sets 
guidelines that connect development to other policy fields. In its 2002 report, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development accepted that development assistance could be useful in 
reducing extreme poverty and attaining sustainable human development in Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs), but only if it is combined with other external inputs like increased policy 
autonomy, development-oriented poverty reduction strategies, and improved governance.35 																																																								
34 Nyberg-Sorensen, N., Engberg-Pedersen, P., & Hear, N. V. (2002). The Migration-Development 
Nexus. IOM Migration Research Series. doi:10.18356/e48ad218-en 
35 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (2002). The Least Developed Countries 
Report: Escaping the Poverty Trap. http://unctad.org/en/docs/ldc2002_en.pdf (accessed 27.04.2018) 
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However, when evaluating the role of external actors such as the EU in the migration-
development nexus, it is important to interrogate the premises of “development agendas”. 
Extensive literature disputes the overall effectiveness of foreign aid and the historically produced 
discourse of “development”. Anthropologist Arturo Escobar (2012) argues that in the post-World 
War II period, Western economic and governance models were presented as the long-term goals 
of development programming and that “development has achieved the status of certainty in the 
social imaginary”.36 Kenyan-American human rights scholar Makau Mutua (2013) interrogates 
the interests of foreign donor governments in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). When 
evaluating the international funding for human rights NGOs in Kenya during the country’s 
precarious wave of democratization, he notes “donor funding is essentially the story of the 
historically managed development of the African state.”37 
With a specific focus on the role of development in migration policy, authors Delgado 
Wise, Márquez Covarrubias, and Puentes (2013) argue that when the issue-linkage of migration 
and development is realized primarily through aid programs, these also overlook the realm of 
neoliberal globalization and unequal development in which contemporary migration is 
embedded. They suggest that the current development aid packages aimed at tackling 
migration’s root causes conceptually involve a one-way flow between two variables: 
development (seen as an independent variable) and migration (seen as a dependent variable). 38 
The goal of stemming migration flows by realizing an external development agenda in countries 
of migrant origin is therefore argued as flawed.  																																																								
36 Escobar, A. (2012). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Page 5. 
37 Mutua, M. (2013). Human Rights NGOs in East Africa Political and Normative Tensions. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. Page 158. 
38 Delgado-Wise, R., Márquez Covarrubias H., and Puentes R. (2013). Reframing the Debate  on 
Migration, Development and Human Rights. Population, Space, and Place. Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 430-43. 
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3.3 The Securitization of Development  
 
The concept of “securitization” was introduced in the study of international relations by 
Barry Buzan, Ole Wœver and Jaap de Wilde at the Copenhagen School. “Securitization” 
delineates a process through which policy choices unrelated to security become “securitized” 
when actors attach a national security value to them and can therefore treat them through 
exceptional means. Thierry Balzacq (2005) defines securitization as: “a rule-governed practice, 
the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the 
discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion.”39 
Since the Cold War, securitization has affected the allocation and implementation of 
official development assistance (ODA), giving rise to the notion of “securitization of 
development”. Brown and Grävingholt (2016) define ODA “a major arena in the emerging 
global governance architecture.”40 The issue of ODA instrumentalization was brought to the 
wider public attention in Western countries after the covert militarization of development in 
Afghanistan.41 Furthermore, concerns as to the securitization of ODA exist not only for the 
intentions of donor governments, but also in regard to the agendas of the governments that are 
receiving development aid. Fisher and Anderson (2010) problematized the role of governments 
in Africa that have embraced the securitization agenda and actively promoted its practice, citing 
																																																								
39 Balzacq, T. (2005). "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol 11, Issue 2, pp. 171 – 201, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960 
40 Brown, S. and Gra ̈vingholt, J. (2016). The Securitization of Foreign Aid. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Page 4. 
41 Fisher, J. and Anderson, D. M. (2015), Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in 
Africa. International Affairs, 91: 131-151. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12190 
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the Ethiopian and Ugandan regimes’ use of Western security initiatives since the 1990s to build 
militarized and strongly authoritarian states.42  
A security lens is therefore necessary to inform our analysis of the EU’s issue-linkage of 
development and migration in its relations with Senegal and other countries of priority focus. In 
line with the Copenhagen School’s securitization critique, Lavenex and Kunz (2008) introduce 
the persistence of security priorities as a limitation to the EU’s stated objective of promoting the 
migration-development nexus in its foreign relations. The authors argue that while the EU has 
changed its rhetoric and is now embracing the linkage of migration and development programs, 
it has not yet implemented concrete policies that are consistent with the stated shift in outlook. 
For example, in analyzing the EU’s policy response to the Ceuta and Melilla migration tensions 
between Spain and Morocco in 2005 and 2006, Lavenex and Kunz (2008) argue that the EU’s 
approach was motivated primarily by security concerns instead of development objectives.43 EU 
migration management therefore remains centered on the security priorities of the European 
migrant-receiving countries, resulting in the utilization of development instruments to 
supplement migration policy objectives in EU external relations. 
 Indeed, Europe’s concerns with security seem to displace Europe’s concerns with 
development.  Baggio and Zanfrini (2006) also identify the securitization of migration as an 
impediment to constructive migration and development issue-linkage in international 
cooperation efforts. They argue that this is because the primary stated goal of migration policy in 
almost all developed countries is fighting irregular migration.44 The European Agenda for 
																																																								
42 Fisher, J. and Anderson, D. M. (2015). 
43 Lavenex, S. and Kunz R. (2008) The Migration–Development Nexus in EU External Relations, Journal 
of European Integration, 30:3, 439-457, DOI: 10.1080/07036330802142152 
44 Baggio, F. and Zanfrini, L. (2006). Migration management and ethics: Envisioning a different 
approach. Monza: Polimetrica. Page 65. 
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Migration, published by the EU Commission in 2015, also states the control of irregular 
migration as its central objective. 
In a cooperative project across universities in Paris, Brussels, and Dakar analyzing 
African and European migration trends, Beauchemin, Kabbanji, Sakho and Schoumaker (2013) 
identify the primacy of security in European border management and control objectives, and 
accordingly argue that diplomacy between African and European leaders is centered on 
European readmission demands. 45 The external focalization of EU diplomatic efforts is aimed at 
formalizing new migration control policies. While the link between migration and development 
was introduced only recently in the Euro-African political agenda, the authors believe that the 
European historical priority for the securitization of migration policy remains central and 
prevents the effective issue-linkage of migration to other governance areas. Lastly, authors 
Keukeleire and Raube (2013) take the securitization debate one step further by identifying the 
concept of “security-development nexus”, arguing that the EU also uses development money to 
improve security structures in third countries and to fund security activities through other 
actors.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
45 Beauchemin, C., Kabbanji, L., Sakho, P., and Schoumaker, B. (2013). Migrations africaines: Le 
code ́veloppement en questions; essai de de ́mographie politique. Paris: Colin. Page 10. 
46 Keukeleire, S. and Raube K. (2013) The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's 
policies towards developing countries. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:3, 556-
572, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2013.822851 
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4. Research Design 
 
 The study draws evidence from expert interviews conducted between May and July 2017. 
I use qualitative data from interviews with EU policy officials in Brussels (Belgium) and Dakar 
(Senegal) representing the following EU institutions: the EU Commission Directorate General 
for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the EU Commission Directorate 
General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), the EU Parliament’s Committee on 
Development, the European External Action Service, the EU Delegation to Senegal and HRVP 
Federica Mogherini’s Cabinet. At the national level, interviews were conducted in Italian 
institutions, including the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Italian Agency for 
Development Cooperation and at the Italian Embassy to Senegal. Italy serves as the EU-member 
state of reference because of its significant involvement on the frontline of Europe’s migrant 
crisis and because of its policy-driving role within the EU for the set-up of migration 
instruments, such as the drafting of the Migration Partnership Framework. On the Senegalese 
side, interviews concerning the non-EU partner country case study included the Senegalese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, 
Finances and of Planning, the Senegalese Embassies to Belgium and to Italy, and the African 
Union Delegation to the European Union.  Interview data also draws from non-governmental 
actors and the civil society sector, encompassing NGOs, think tanks, foundations, and 
academics. 
Because approaches to migration management are affected by an actor’s relative location 
and physical proximity to the crisis, the interview methodology was designed to engage with EU, 
Senegalese, and Italian actors across all three countries (Belgium, Senegal and Italy). Differences 
 		
27 
in approach, for example between national government headquarters and embassies on foreign 
soil, are highlighted. 
In addition to the interview-based qualitative data, the study also analyzes the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Migration Partnership Framework European Union as 
issue-linkage instruments. Other EU migration management documents, development policy 
platforms, and funding sources are also considered, including the European Agenda on 
Migration, EU Commission quarterly reports on the implementation of the Migration Partnership 
Framework, the European Parliament Resolution “Addressing Refugee and Migrant Movements: 
the Role of EU External Action”, and press releases, among others. Senegalese national 
documents also contribute to the analysis: the Plan Sénégal Émergent, the Politique Nationale de 
Migration du Sénégal, and the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Plan Stratégique et 
Opérationnel are accounted for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 		
28 
5. Section A - Migration and Development Issue-Linkage within European Union 
Governance 
 
Migration has emerged as an issue capable of influencing the structural nature of EU 
governance and institutional relations. Within the rise of migration as a factor of political 
salience, this section evaluates the self-reinforcing relationship between EU governance 
limitations and the choice of issue-linkage as a policy instrument for the externalization of 
migration management. I argue that migration and development issue-linkage within EU 
policymaking occurs within a patchwork of (1) soft law instruments and (2) priority divergences 
across EU institutions and partner countries, within which EU Parliamentary oversight is 
identified as an example. These divergences affect the initial premise as well as the conclusive 
effectiveness of issue-linkage programs.  
 
5.1 The EU’s Soft Law Framework for Migration Management  
 
 The study places the EU’s emerging soft law framework for international migration 
management within Alexander Betts’s “fragmented tapestry” of migration global governance and 
Sandra Lavenex’s “socialization and transgovernmental networking” interpretation of EU 
external governance mechanisms.  Legally binding agreements within migration management are 
rare, and the EU’s externalization efforts are no exception.  
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The realm of “soft law” begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more 
of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation. 47 Soft law agreements often occur 
because legally binding “hard law” obligations for the delegation of authority entail contested 
restrictions of actors’ behavior and sovereignty. Consequently, while criticized by some as 
“window dressing” for its lack of enforcement powers or as “destabilizing” for its decreased 
accountability, soft law can also be a preferable institutional arrangement within incomplete 
global frameworks or issues of significant international tension, such as migration.48 
 Table 2 categorizes the EU’s migration management instruments for the Central 
Mediterranean Route discerning between treaties (hard law instruments), policy frameworks, 
intergovernmental dialogue platforms, financial instruments, and political platforms signed 
before, during, or after the Europe-Africa Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015. The 
categorization highlights the heterogeneity in instruments by type, geographical groupings, and 
actors and shows the prevalence of a soft law approach to migration in EU external relations. 
 
Table 2. Categorization and signatories of EU migration management instruments for the 
Central Mediterranean Route 
EU Legal Instrument Date, Type of Agreement and Signatories  
Before the Valletta 2015 Summit 
Cotonou Agreement Treaty (2000) - The framework for EU's relations with 79 countries from Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). Article 13 states the joint commitment of 
signatories to migrant return and readmission agreements. 
Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM) 
Policy framework (2005) - The overarching framework of the EU external 
migration and asylum policy. 
																																																								
47 Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International 
Organization, 54(3), 421-456.  
48 Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. (2000). 
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European Neighborhood 
Policy  
Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2014) between 
EU and partner countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, 
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Syria, 
Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine. 
Rabat Process Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2006) for the 
Western Mediterranean migration route: Belgium, Burkina Faso, Equatorial 
Guinea, France, Italy, Mali, Morocco, Portugal Senegal, Spain, the EU 
Commission and  and the ECOWAS. 
Khartoum Process Intergovernmental dialogue platform and financial instrument (2014) - led by a 
Steering Committee comprised of five EU Member States (Italy, France, 
Germany, UK, Malta), five partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South 
Sudan, Sudan) as well as the EU Commission, the EEAS and the AU 
Commission.  
European Agenda on 
Migration 
Political platform (2015) 
European Commission, 13th May 2015. 
Valletta 2015 Summit Results 
Valletta Action Plan Political platform (2015) 
Signed by Valletta Summit Participants, 11-12 November 2015. 
EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa 
Financial instrument (2015) 
Followed the Valletta Summit on Migration to “provide additional funding and 
will contribute to a flexible, speedy and efficient delivery of support to foster 
stability and to contribute to better migration management. [...] to help address 
the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration” 
After the Valletta 2015 Summit 
Migration Partnership 
Framework 
Political platform (2016) with third countries of origin and transit using all 
policies and instruments at the EU's disposal to achieve concrete results. 
 
2016 Partners: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia 
2017 New Partners: Ghana, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire  
European External 
Investment Plan 
Financial instrument (2016) 
Encourages investment in partner countries in Africa and the EU Neighborhood 
region 
 
The fragmentation of the EU’s instruments for migration management is also felt from 
the Senegalese and African Union perspective. At a basic negotiating level, multiple officials 
repeatedly underscored the continued persistence in priority difference for African and European 
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representatives at the negotiating table for migration instruments. An official at the African 
Union Delegation to the EU highlighted the AU’s commitment to pursuing a continental policy 
framework based on the principle of mobility rather than migration.49 Instead, as highlighted in 
Table 2, the EU often opts for a tapestry of bilateral or regionally focused instruments. The 
Senegalese Embassy to Belgium also criticized “The tendency of the EU to separate African 
countries for cooperation efforts.”50 An official at the AU Delegation to the EU described his 
surprise at the EU’s bilateral approach in the Migration Partnership Framework in 2016 with five 
African countries (including Senegal), after the instruments at Valletta Summit on Migration had 
not forseen bilateral action.  
“When Valletta came up, the AU’s position was: we already have the continental 
framework. If Valletta is very much important to you, let us make sure all AU 
countries are involved, because for now your rationale is that you are focusing on 
hotspot countries, but what about us involving everybody before countries 
become hotspots tomorrow. But if you have been dealing with the EU, you 
realize that the EU as an institution is not a proactive institution. Mostly all EU 
policies are reactive.” 51  
 
In response, Italian and EU officials cited the difficulty of negotiating with some African 
governments as a reason for their preference to cultivate bilateral structured relationships.52  
Overall, the tapestry of soft law instruments renders the externalization of EU migration policy 
fragmented and affects its working relationships with partner countries and institutions such as 
Senegal and the African Union. However, the pursuit of a soft law approach is contextualized by 
Betts’s framework for global migration governance and Lavenex’s research on the EU’s 
socialization networking approach to external governance. 																																																								
49 Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 18.06.2017 
50 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017 
51 Interview, AU Delegation to the EU, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
52 Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017, and Interview, European External Action 
Service, Brussels, 29.06.2017 
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5.2 Divergence Among EU Institutions on the Issue-Linkage of Migration and Development 
 
When zooming in from the EU’s larger international soft law framework to analyze intra-
institutional dynamics, the fragmentation of mandates and instruments is replicated. An official 
at DG DEVCO summarized the EU’s new institutional cooperation landscape as: 
“There is indeed much more coordination and you feel like it is more embedded in 
external policy, which was not the case before. DG HOME is a lot more associated 
with DG DEVCO. Even within the Commission you have new actors like the 
Secretary General that became also quite active in coordinating, and of course with 
member states as well. In the past we have coordinated with them as well but never to 
this extent.”53 
 
 While coordination among EU institutions on migration issues was reported as increased, 
the convergence of institutional priorities did not necessarily follow suit. Table 3 summarizes the 
interview outcomes across EU institutions with regards to institutional priorities within the 
linkage of migration management objectives to development policy instruments. 
Table 3. Interview outcomes at EU institutions 
EU Institution Institutional Priority for Migration and Development Issue-Linkage 
EU Commission, DG International Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO) Development 
EU Commission 
DG Home Affairs (HOME) Security 
EU Commission 
European External Action Service (EEAS) Foreign Relations 
EU Parliament 
Development Committee (DEVE) Human Rights and Institutional Oversight 
HRVP Mogherini Cabinet Migration Management 
Delegation of the European Union to Senegal EU-Senegal Relations, Development 
																																																								
53 Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
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Even though migration policy is being directed at the highest levels of the EU 
Commission,54 Table 3 shows the divergence in institutional mandates as pronounced. While 
officials at DG DEVCO expressed concern over the use of development funding for migration 
projects, officials at DG HOME instead focused on the role of issue-linkage instruments in 
facilitating the EU’s negotiations for the increase in the identification and readmission of 
migrants in irregular status. The European External Action Service embraced a broader approach 
based on the importance of long-term foreign policy relations with partner countries, relations 
that the EU Delegation to Senegal was building and maintaining on the ground in Dakar. At the 
EU Delegation to Senegal, the new appointment in February 2017 of a Migration Liaison Officer 
as prescribed in the Migration Partnership Framework marked the increase in the externalization 
of EU migration policy.  
At a national level, institutional discrepancies also complicate the position of EU member 
states on issues of migration and development issue-linkage. At the Italian Embassy to Senegal 
in Dakar, public officials stated that “There is not a unitary position within the Italian 
Government” with regards to the revision of development instruments for the pursuit of 
migration management objectives such as returns, readmissions, and border patrol. 55 
Inconsistencies within EU member states also contribute to the network of interests at play 
within the European Union. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
54 Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 23.06.2017 
55 Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017 
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5.3 Parliamentary Scrutiny 
 
Within the fragmentation of EU institutional priorities and operations, one implication of 
the divergent technocratic nature of migration-development governance is that parliamentary 
oversight is severely hampered. Since the Migration Partnership Framework and the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa are not binding legal instruments, governments are not 
required to present these texts for parliamentary approval. As a consequence, the European 
Parliament lacks oversight on the implementation of the Migration Partnership Framework and 
on the allocation of funds via the EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa, which is managed by 
the EU Commission. This has stoked discontent in the European Parliament. 
In a January 2017 press release, the EU Parliament Development Committee called for 
better oversight over the EU’s Trust Funds and External Investment Plan and stated “Funding to 
tackle the root causes of migration is meant to help social development, not to stop refugees.”56 
As a follow-up to the initial press release, the Development Committee proposed the resolution 
“Addressing Refugee and Migrant Movements: the Role of EU External Action”, which was 
officially adopted by the Parliament on April 5th, 2017. In the resolution, the Parliament: 
“Deeply regrets than in the EU migration policy framework and refugee movements 
response, the EU and its Members States have opted for the conclusion of 
agreements with third countries, which avoid the parliamentary scrutiny attached to 
the Community method.”57 
																																																								
56 European Parliament Development Committee Press Release, (2017). 25 January 2017. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170124IPR59772/meps-set-priorities-for-a-new-
impetus-in-development (accessed 05.02.2018) 
57 European Parliament, (2015). European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on addressing refugee 
and migrant movements: the role of EU External Action, Article 70.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0124 
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The resolution specifically addressed the lack of scrutiny afforded to the Parliament by the 
Commission over the linkage of migration management to development cooperation 
programming. The European Parliament: 
“Draws attention to the intention to revise development cooperation programming 
documents to deliver on the new migration compacts; stresses that this revision 
needs to be carried out in line with development effectiveness principles and in 
dialogue with partner countries, European and local civil society organisations and 
the private sector; calls for Parliament to be fully involved at all stages of the 
revision, including programming documents under the European Development 
Fund (EDF).”58 
The European Parliament also expressed concern over migration instruments being 
negotiated outside of the Valletta Summit framework with other third countries, such as the Joint 
Way Forward on Migration political platform, signed by Afghanistan and the European Union in 
2016 (Article 69, see associated footnote).59 Overall, as a result, the European Parliament: 
“Urges the Commission and the EEAS to provide Parliament and the public, at the 
earliest opportunity, with a detailed overview of the various funding instruments 
and programmes – and how they fit together with Member State programs – in the 
16 priority countries with which the EU engages in high-level dialogues on 
migration.” 
The Open Society European Policy Institute also highlighted reduced parliamentary 
scrutiny as an issue of democratic deficit with regards to the European Union’s external response 
to the migration crisis and noted the similarity of the situation in the Italian National Parliament, 
																																																								
58 European Parliament, (2017). Article 63.  
59 European Parliament, (2017). Article 69:  “Regrets the lack of consultation and transparency in the 
formulation of the recently signed Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the 
EU, which is mainly focused on readmissions and contemplates unlimited returns of Afghan citizens, 
whether on a voluntary basis or not; is worried about the possible consequences for Afghan asylum-
seekers, who in 2016 constitute the second-largest national group in the EU applying for asylum.”  
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which has also not been granted oversight over Italy’s border policing agreements with non-EU 
partner countries.60 
The European Parliament’s oversight concerns underscore the friction among EU 
institutions with regards to the management of migration and development policy. Furthermore, 
the restriction of parliamentary scrutiny should also be interpreted as a securitization pattern. 
When actors attach a national security value to an issue, exceptional operational means are often 
justified. Consequently, the decrease in parliamentary oversight over the EU Commission’s 
actions on migration management could be considered as a manifestation of the securitization of 
development policy through issue-linkage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
60 Interview, Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
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6. Section B: The Impacts of Issue-Linkage on Development Objectives 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Described as “an instrument that helps to better target development aid towards countries 
of priority cooperation in the Migration Partnership Framework”,61 the EU Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa was launched at the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration as one of the primary 
tools for the linkage of migration management to development policy and funding sources. The 
Fund is officially aimed at addressing the “root causes” of destabilization, displacement and 
irregular migration by promoting economic opportunity, security, and development. 62  An 
increase in development funding allocation for migration management purposes is one of the five 
goals outlined in the Valletta Action Plan. However, during the initial stages of cooperation, the 
increase in financial instruments has been the most utilized and cited of the five goals by EU 
leaders.63 When asked about the EU’s increased focus on the instrumentalization of development 
funding within the five pillars of the Valletta Action Plan, officials in DG DEVCO observed that: 
“I think that it has been the easiest, especially in the eyes of members. It's just been 
the easiest to pour more money, whether that's good or bad, whether it's useful or 
not. One year after we see the limitations.”64 
 
Officials at the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium also noted the “obsession with numbers 
as a solution” exhibited by EU officials when discussing migration-development cooperation 																																																								
61 Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017 
62 EU Commission, DG for International Development and Cooperation. (2018). 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en (accessed 12.02.2018) 
63 The Five Pillars of the Valletta Action Plan: 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement // 2. Legal migration and mobility // 3. 
Protection and asylum // 4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings // 5. Return, readmission and reintegration 
64 Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 23.06.2017 
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efforts with African partners, both in relation to repatriation and migration flows, as well as to 
development aid allocation.65 During an interview at the African Union Delegation to the 
European Union, an AU official expressed his reservations with regards to the strategy of 
tackling migration flows through development programming: “Root causes is the buzz word.”66 
The following section uses evidence from the expert interviews to evaluate the effects of 
issue-linkage on development cooperation. I will analyze the EU’s push to interlace migration 
and development cooperation in terms of funding allocation, project design, and project 
implementation. At the micro-level of project outcome, the implications of issue-linkage on 
development goals are that (1) resources are mostly displaced from development programs rather 
than increased, (2) committed resources are too small to make a difference, and (3) the financial 
instruments are not embedded in a long-term shared political vision. In the subsequent sections, I 
will show that the broader development goals of the migration-development nexus are 
undermined by two structural factors: the securitization of development and the disputed role of 
the EU as a development actor within non-EU partner countries. While European officials in 
interviews repeatedly denied the existence of strict conditionality, the effects of security-driven 
priorities are apparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
65 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017 
66 Interview, African Union Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
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6.2 Evaluating Funding Allocation, Project Design and Implementation  
 
Several developments seem to indicate goal displacement at the micro-level of 
development projects. For one, funding for the new EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has 
been diverted from pre-existing development funding sources, primarily the European 
Development Fund. Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the European 
Development Fund (EDF) is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). Out of 
the 2.6 billion euros pledged for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa at the 2015 Valletta 
Summit, 2.3 billion euros came from the 2015-2020 European Development Fund.67 Effectively, 
most of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa therefore re-packages pre-existing 
development funding in a new issue-linkage instrument. The European Union External Action 
Service underscored this trend: “It has changed the way it is sold, not the substance.”68 
Understanding the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa in terms funding diversion presents the 
Fund not as a new development cooperation instrument, but rather a re-packaged funding source 
subject to increased EU directional control for its linkage to migration goals.  
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa is part of a broader financial envelope, which 
is visualized in the chart below. The chart shows higher resource allocation for action outside the 
EU (12.4 billion euros) compared to inside the EU (9.6 billion euros), confirming the EU’s 
strong externalization outlook of migration management in terms of its financial instruments.  
 																																																								
67 EU Commission, DG International Cooperation and Development, (2018). EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa Factsheet, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa-
20180226_en.pdf (accessed 19.03.2018) 
68 Interview, European External Action Service, Brussels, 29.06.2017 
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Figure 1 - Source: European Agenda on Migration 
 
Allocation of EU overseas development assistance (ODA) for the relief of migration’s 
root causes must also be understood in relation to other sources of income and capital flow. In a 
2017 discussion paper, the European Policy Center (EPC) challenged the effectiveness of using 
development funding for migration flow management. It claims that the EU’s foreign aid 
commitment dwarfs with other investment sources linked to migration flows, such as foreign 
direct investment, remittances, and private debt and portfolio equity. Similarly, staff at the Open 
Society Initiative for West Africa stated, “the amounts are derisory”, in relation to the EU’s 
focus on project-based development assistance to tackle migration flows.69 The EPC graph below 
shows the lower magnitude of ODA with respect to other sources of income and questions the 
effectiveness of the EU’s use of ODA as the primary economic mechanism for the relief of root 
causes of displacement.70 
 
 																																																								
69 Interview, Open Society Initiative West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017 
70 Funk, M., Namara F., Pardo R., and Rose N. (2017). Tackling Irregular Migration Through 
Development – A Flawed Approach?, European Policy Center 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7693_tacklingirregularmigrationthroughdevelopment.pdf?doc
_id=1857 (accessed 13.02.2018) 
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Graph 2: European Policy Center, Remittances to developing countries compared to ODA 
and private capital flow 
 
Officials within Senegalese institutions also highlighted the importance of remittances. 
Personal remittances comprise all personal transfers in cash or in kind made or received by 
residents to or from nonresident households or individuals.71 At the Senegalese Ministry of the 
Economy, Planning and Human Development, the interviewed official focused on the domestic 
development catalyzed by remittances in terms of education and healthcare investment.72 In 
relation to remittance flows, the Senegalese Ambassador to Italy stated in an interview: “Italy 
has now become a factor of stability in Senegal”.73 The research therefore not only supports the 
case that the EU’s cooperation efforts with countries of priority focus should increase their focus 																																																								
71 World Bank, (2018). Metadata, Long Definition, Personal remittances, paid (current US$).  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=Personal%20remittanc
es,%20paid%20(current%20US$)&Code=BM.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddlS
electedValue=TUN&ReportID=4001&ReportType=Table (accessed 19.03.2018) 
72 Interview, Senegalese Ministry of the Economy, Planning and Human Development, Dakar, 06.06.2017 
73 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017 
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on other forms of investment and capital flow in order to work towards the migration-
development nexus, but also that there is significant potential and openness to cooperation within 
partner countries for this avenue. Graphs 3 and 4 underscore the relevance of remittances as a % 
of national GDP in the 16 countries of priority focus of EU externalization efforts, with a 
particular focus on the evolution of Senegalese remittance percentages from 1980 to 2016 in 
conjunction with migration flow fluctuation and the shift in the economic conditions of the 
Senegalese diaspora. In Senegal, remittances from the diaspora are said to be the first source of 
foreign currency in the country.74 
Graph 3: Personal remittances received (% of GDP) 
Data was drawn from World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP estimates.75 The 16 countries of priority focus within EU migration management 
efforts were considered, although no data was available for Eritrea, Somalia and Niger. 
 
 																																																								
74 Devillard, A., Bacchi, A., and Noack, M. (2016). A survey on migration policies in West Africa. 
Vienna: ICMPD, International Centre for Migration Policy Development. 
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Graph 4: Senegal, Personal remittances received, 1980-2016 (% of GDP) 
Data was drawn from World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
 
During the study’s expert interviews, the ownership of migration-related projects within 
the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was also discussed as a problematic factor. The Open 
Society Institute for West Africa admonished European Union representatives for excessive 
project development in Brussels rather than with Open Society Institute for West Africa in local 
Senegalese communities: 
“What shocked me the most was that there are projects identified in Brussels, the 
appropriation of these projects, projects that are managed by European actors.”76 
 
In interviews with the delegations of European member states to Senegal (Agencia 
Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo – AECID for Spain, Italian 
Cooperation for Development for Italy), observations were also made with regards to what was 																																																								
76 Interview, Open Society Initiative for West Africa, Dakar, 30.05.2017 
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described as an “arbitrariness” of EU development funding distribution for migration-related 
projects. An official at AECID noted the renewed influx of funding and interest driven by EU 
officials, despite the stabilization of Spain’s cooperation efforts with Senegal for migration 
purposes since the 2005-2006 migration management crisis between the two countries. In the 
case of Senegal, nine development projects have originated from the Migration Partnership 
Framework and are being funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (See Appendix 
A). However, the Italian Cooperation for Development within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
noted that the funding that it is receiving for the projects is being managed primarily by Italian 
NGOs in Senegal. While all projects now have at least one Senegalese partner, concerns persist 
as to their design and the levels of local ownership. 
The EU Delegation to Senegal responded to project ownership concerns by reporting the 
successful cooperation relationships for migration management as well as the strength of EU-
Senegal relations overall. With regards to the ownership of projects: “The delegation feeds the 
analysis conducted in Brussels.”77  The Senegalese human rights NGO “Rencontre Africaine 
pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme” (RADDHO) noted its positive experience for a 
migration project that it applied and received EU funding for, underscoring the significance of 
local project ownership in non-EU partner countries.78  The Senegalese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Senegalese Abroad remarked the concerns of project design and ownership as 
improved since the initial signing of the Migration Partnership Framework in 2016.79 
Various actors noted the lack of a “political vision” for the cooperation between the EU 
and partner countries for migration management. AECID officials stated: “The cooperation was 
																																																								
77 Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017 
78 Interview, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, Dakar, 31.05.2017 
79 Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017 
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not directed at a political level for migration management, it was done through small projects.”80 
The absence of what Open Society Initiative for West Africa officials defined a “participatory 
approach” to a long-term partnership for migration management is perceived as a salient 
problem. A shared political vision for the issue-linkage of migration and development is 
warranted also because research has demonstrated that higher levels of economic and human 
development do not automatically result in a reduction of migratory flows; rather, they are 
associated with higher overall levels of migration. 81 According to the “U-curve effect”, we can 
expect a decrease in emigration only after a long period of sustained economic growth, because 
the need for resources to migrate suggests that it is opportunity rather than income differential 
that determines the choice to migrate. In line with the “U-curve effect” model, it is not the 
poorest countries in the Sahel region that are sending the largest proportion of irregular migrants 
to Europe. Indeed, the majority of migrants originate from more developed and distant countries 
such as Nigeria, Senegal and Ivory Coast, despite the fact that countries such as Niger, Chad, and 
Burkina Faso have lower UNDP Human Development Indexes and are also located on the 
Central Mediterranean migration route towards Europe.82 By further contextualizing Europe-
Africa migration patterns, it becomes evident that a unidirectional approach to development 
through project sponsorship is not sufficient to fulfill the migration-development nexus. 
 
 
  																																																								
80 Interview, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, Dakar, 31.05.2017 
81 De Haas, H. (2010). Migration Transitions: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry into the 
Developmental Drivers of International Migration. IMI Working Papers, No. 24. 
https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/ publications/wp-24-10. (accessed 10.01.2018)  
82 Ranieri, L. and Rossi, A. (2017). The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality 
Check. Istituto Affari Internazionali. (17), 26. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1726.pdf (accessed 
19.03.2018) 
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6.3 Evaluating Conditionality and Securitization in the Migration-Development Nexus 
 
 The following two sections argue that the broader development goals of the migration-
development nexus are hampered by two structural factors: the securitization of development 
programming and the disputed role of the EU as a development actor within non-EU partner 
countries. This section considers the securitization of development as a circumstance that 
requires the expansion of the concept of “conditionality” when evaluating the displacement of 
development goals within EU issue-linkage. 
Closely linked to rational choice logic, conditionality in international relations is defined 
as a mechanism of material incentives used by states and international institutions to influence 
the behavior of other states.83 Conditionality relations expect that external incentives will change 
the utility calculations of actors by raising the costs of non-compliance or by offering additional 
benefits. In interviews, EU officials rejected the notion of conditionality with regards to the 
migration-development nexus by stating that it is neither the intention nor the desired outcome of 
EU external action. Still, the security narrative is an aggravating factor, and while it may not 
manifest in the form of rigid and conditional issue-linkage relations, it echoes the stricter models 
based on establishing conditions for the provision of financial benefits. Consequently, security-
driven interests undermine the scope, legitimacy, and effectiveness of recent EU efforts to render 
development assistance an incentive for non-EU partner countries to cooperate on migration 
management. 
 Firstly, it is relevant to note that European institutional and national actors explicitly deny 
the existence of conditionality with respect to migration and development. As re-enforced by 																																																								
83 Koch, S. (2015). A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual Horizons Based on 
Lessons from the European Union. World Development, Volume 75, Pages 97-108. 
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HRVP Federica Mogherini at the EU Parliament High-Level Conference for Migration 
Management in June 2017, the European Union insists it is not imposing conditionality but 
instead chooses a  “more for more” approach, which it describes as providing positive incentives 
for development cooperation with African countries on migration. Migration is a working 
priority at the highest levels of the EU Commission,84 and the HRVP Cabinet directly addressed 
conditionality implications and concerns by stating: 
“The HRVP has been repeated and crystal clear insofar no conditionality is sought 
in any way in relations to the Migration Partnerships. We are working on a “more 
for more” basis as also identified in all the policy documents issued by the 
European Commission. The EU Trust Fund for Africa is not a conditionality 
instrument; it is an instrument targeting some specific objectives set in its founding 
act and corresponding politically to the implementation of the Valletta Action 
Plan.”85 
 
Actors in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also rejected conditionality: 
“We are not on the frontline. Speaking about conditionality in such brutal terms is 
not warranted because it is neither Italy’s position nor the European Union’s.” 86 
 
However, an official from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that on a 
bilateral basis Italy is prepared to pursue conditionality agreements for visas for Africans in 
exchange for cooperation on the identification and repatriation of illegal nationals from the same 
countries.87 Italy’s bilateral pursuits point to a willingness among certain EU member states to 
consider conditionality structures within the framework of the Valletta 2015 instruments. An 
																																																								
84 Interview, EU Commission, DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
85 Interview via email correspondence, HRVP Federica Mogherini’s Cabinet, Brussels, 28.06.2017 
86 Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG International 
Migration and Italians Abroad, Rome, 13.07.2017 
87 Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union 
External Relations, Rome, Italy, 07.07.2017 
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official in the European External Action Service appeared to corroborate that the EU and its 
member states do not necessarily see eye to eye on conditionality. 
“It is a sensitive issue. They [The ministries of interior and foreign affairs] have 
different views on aid conditionality. It is being continuously negotiated – some 
push for it within the EU, some do not.”88 
 
 Divergent approaches also emerge across EU institutions. Officials at DG DEVCO 
expressed their support for utilizing issue-linkage as a current strategy. However, they also 
maintained a more cautious approach in comparison to other EU institutions, stating that it would 
be out of the question for DG DEVCO to undermine development objectives by endorsing 
funding conditionality to incentivize migrant readmission programs.  
 “With so much pressure to use more and more development aid as incentive and as 
leverage, that's a very thin line. There is a thin line between "more for more" and 
conditionality. It's not the same, and I think that we have to be very careful. But I 
don't think that at least for the moment, we are safe. We have good arguments and 
good basis.”89  
 
Even if one takes the European Union’s stated absence of conditionality at face value, the 
interplay between development and security priorities within the EU’s “more for more” system 
of positive incentives must be examined. More specifically, can securitization be considered as 
present within issue-linkage? A variety of actors certainly think so: officials from think-tanks 
such Open Society European Policy Institute and the European Policy Center, the Senegalese 
Embassy to Belgium, and the African Union Delegation to the European Union expressed 
concerns as to the nature of the EU’s development aid offered by the EU Emergency Trust Fund 
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for Africa due to its links to articulated security prerogatives. 90   The securitization of 
development in Europe had sharply increased after the September 11 terror attack, and it appears 
to have intensified in response to Europe’s migration crisis. The issues of migration and 
terrorism are themselves linked in policy discourses, as confirmed during an interview at the 
Italian Embassy to Senegal. When discussing the new programs implemented under the 
Migration Partnership Framework, an Embassy official stated, “More cooperation among police 
forces can only be beneficial in avoiding the most pathological outcome, namely terrorism.”91 
The prioritization of security was highlighted when a representative from DG HOME 
maintained a strong focus on security and readmissions in line with the overall mandate of the 
DG’s operations, despite working a lot more closely with DG DEVCO for the realization of 
development goals within migration management. 
 “We are ready to give them [African partner countries] more support from the EU 
Trust Fund but at the same time we expect some help from their side on the topics 
that we need to advance. So we expect some sort of commitment and results on 
irregular migration for instance, and then we are happy to support them in better 
managing migration. […] But on the other hand, if they don't show up to work with 
us, the EU is not going to continue with the Trust Fund. There is also mention of if 
the countries are really unwilling to cooperate, the EU and member states should 
look at all the leverage that they have at their disposal and use it either in a positive 
way or in a negative way. It did not mean linking aid, it meant whatever policy 
instruments we have, for example visa policy, or the number of student grants that 
we are offering.”92 
 
The persistence of securitization, highlighted by the stated goals and actions of DG 
HOME and by a variety of external actors, calls for the expansion of our interpretation of 
																																																								
90 Interviews: Open Society European Policy Institute (Brussels, 23.06.2017), European Policy Center 
(Brussels, 15.06.2017), Senegalese Embassy to Belgium (Brussels, 28.06.2017), African Union 
Delegation to the European Union (Brussels, 19.06.2017), 
91 Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017 
92 Interview, EU Commission, DG HOME, Brussels, 22.06.2017 
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systems of incentives beyond strict conditionality models. Securitization undermines the EU’s 
“more for more” system of positive incentives and the realization of the migration-development 
nexus in EU-Senegal relations by contributing to the displacement of development goals within 
issue-linkage. 
 
6.4 Evaluating the Role of the EU as a Development Actor and Alternatives to Foreign Aid 
within Issue-Linkage  
 
 Finally, when evaluating the displacement of development goals within issue-linkage, it 
is important to analyze the role of external actors such as the EU in the establishment and 
realization of development objectives. For example, the Open Society European Policy Institute 
noted “the irresistibility of EU money” 93  within migration management cooperation with 
Senegal, and echoed Arturo Escobar’s (2012) case that in the post-World War II period 
“development policies became mechanisms of control that were just as pervasive and effective as 
their colonial counterparts”.94 In addition to the controversy regarding the EU’s structural role as 
a development actor within the allocation of foreign aid through issue-linkage instruments, we 
must note that the EU’s foreign aid commitment dwarfs with other investment sources linked to 
migration flows, as already discussed in Section 6.2. 
However, in September 2016, the European Commission inaugurated a new effort to 
diversify the EU’s financial cooperation mechanisms within issue-linkage. The European 
Investment Bank presented the European External Investment Plan as an instrument for the 
																																																								
93 Interview, Open Society European Policy Institute, Brussels, 23.06.2017 
94 Escobar, A. (2012). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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expansion of structured investment by European parties in African countries of migrant origin 
and transit.95 The European External Investment Plan is described by the EEAS as an instrument 
that will “help us mobilize the private sector that has to come more to the picture, to stimulate 
investments exactly where they are more needed and more difficult to reach.”96  
 Senegalese representatives also welcomed the preliminary shift towards an investment-driven 
approach to economic growth within issue-linkage. At the Senegalese Embassy in Rome, 
officials recognized the importance of development within the broader management of 
migrations: “The European Union cannot control migration in Africa as long as Africa is an 
under-developed continent.”97 Officials at the Senegalese Embassy to Italy and the Senegalese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed their goal of creating opportunities and structures for the 
Senegalese diaspora to invest directly in Senegal: “It is necessary to integrate investment into 
migration policies.”98 An official at Senegal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Senegal’s 
strategic engagement with the EU for migration and development issue-linkage: 
“Today we are in a process of economic diplomacy. In this economic diplomacy 
process, it is important to favor the maximum amount of foreign direct investment. 
This is the reason why we are working to increase our network of economic offices 
[in Senegalese Embassies abroad].”99 
 
 This quote not only highlights the Senegalese government’s national agenda for its 
cooperation with the EU, but also reinforces the continuous negotiation framework that defines 
the linkage of migration and development policy. Overall, the European External Investment 																																																								
95 European External Action Service, EU External Investment Plan Factsheet, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4_external_investment_plan_3pg.pdf (accessed 21.08.2017) 
96 European External Action Service, Remarks by Federica Mogherini at the Valletta Joint Action Plan 
2017 Senior Officials Meeting, (Brussels, 08/02/2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/20176/remarks-federica-mogherini-valletta-joint-action-plan-2017-senior-officials-
meeting_en (accessed 24.02.2018) 
97 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017 
98 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Italy, Rome, 30.06.2017 
99 Interview, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, Dakar, 08.06.2017 
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Plan is a promising new issue-linkage instrument that engages with the migration-development 
nexus outside of the predominant ODA models. However, its preliminary approach and 
outcomes are yet to be observed, as it is unclear what development role it will be able to play 
within the EU’s predominantly security-driven agenda for migration management in Senegal and 
in other countries of priority focus. 
 
7. Section C: The Impacts of Issue-Linkage on Migration Management Objectives 
 
During an interview with the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, an official summarized 
Senegal’s relations with the EU for migration management as: “There are two issues of tension 
with the EU: identification and human rights, as well as the difficulties associated with the 
conditionality of aid.”100  After aid conditionality and securitization were shown to be primary 
concerns in the displacement of development goals in Section B, now Section C focuses on the 
impact of issue-linkage on migration management objectives. The identified issues of contention 
within EU-Senegal migration management cooperation are the two broader reform needs for (1) 
legal migration and (2) the safeguard of human rights, in addition to (3) the short-term 
cooperation mechanism for identification and readmission. Each is respectively examined in 
terms of goal displacement. 
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7.1 Legal Migration 
 
 Despite being one of the five pillars of the 2015 Valletta Action Plan for the cooperation 
among European and African actors, legal migration has not been at the forefront of migration 
management efforts between the European Union and its countries of priority focus. Authors 
Nyberg-Sørensen, Engberg-Pedersen, and Hear (2002) consider legal migration opportunities as 
an essential tool for the realization of the migration-development nexus and for the economic 
development not only for the countries of migrant origin, but also for the countries of migrant 
destination.101 
 Legal migration is one of the primary points of divergence among African and European 
leaders. With regards to AU-EU cooperation relations leading up to the Valletta Summit on 
Migration, an African Union official stated: 
“The discussion was mostly on migration; the EU was not interested in discussing 
mobility and employment. That was were the challenges started. Because for us it 
was important to continue the engagement, but we also realized that instead of a 
dialogue it was largely a monologue. […] The European temple was not interested 
in mobility.” 102 
 
 The African Union Delegation to the European Union criticized the EU’s focus on 
stemming migration flows, rather than on the use of human mobility as a tool for local 
development and economic growth. On the EU side, the EU Migration Liaison in Senegal agreed 
by stating, “Currently, there are not enough legal migration opportunities”.103 An interview with 
an official at the EU Commission DG HOME highlighted the DG’s continued focus on 
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identification and readmission efforts rather than on legal migration initiatives.104 The EU’s 
intergovernmental bargaining framework and security lens are therefore overshadowing 
international efforts to increase legal migration opportunities. Officials in the EU Commission 
DG DEVCO in fact indicated the incomplete supranational integration of migration management 
competences as a primary reason for the lack of progress on legal migration objectives: 
 
 “We are doing a lot. We can only work on intra-regional [migration], we cannot 
work on legal migration apart from strengthening the institutions that work on legal 
migration because that is not our competence.” 105 
 
On the Senegalese side, an official at the Ministry for the Economy, Finances, and 
Planning stated that European and African actors must build on the mutual understanding with 
regards to the importance of legal migration and domestic opportunities that was established at 
the Valletta Summit.  
 
“The points that are in it [the Valletta Action Plan] are consensual. It is necessary 
to develop alternatives in countries of migrant origin to create hope and allow for 
populations to reach fulfillment at home.”106 
 
An official at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the EU’s 
responsibility in acknowledging the contribution of irregular migrant labor to Europe’s 
economies: “There are young people who are in an irregular status but that contribute a lot to 
their [European] economies […]. They must be legalized.”107 
Lastly, a variety of Senegalese officials indicated the importance of investing in 
alternative legal migration avenues. At the Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, an official 
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105 Interview, EU Commission, DG DEVCO, Brussels, 19.06.2017 
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highlighted the role of university exchange programs and seasonal work permits in order for the 
country to invest in human capital development.108 Senegalese officials at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs instead expressed the government priority of engaging the diaspora through investment 
programs, as outlined in the Ministry’s Plan Stratégique et Opérationnel.109  
Conclusively, this section highlights the overall acknowledgement by both European and 
Senegalese actors of the importance of legal migration within the migration-development nexus. 
However, goal displacement and divergence in the prioritization of legal migration still persist 
within security-driven EU-Senegal cooperation efforts, despite the signing of joint political 
platforms such as the Valletta Action Plan. 
 
7.2 Human rights 
 
The lack of sufficient prioritization of individual migrant human rights is a second 
example of migration management goal displacement within issue-linkage. Two factors are 
primarily associated with the displacement of human rights as a cooperation priority: (1) the 
utilization of development programming for border security enhancement and (2) the 
outsourcing of migration management responsibilities. 
The Open Society Institute for European Policy recalls that the intensification of border 
security in Africa along the Central Mediterranean Route needs to be consistently monitored to 
ensure that the human rights of migrants are upheld.110 The EU’s agenda for the stemming of 
flows in Agadez, Niger’s hotspot for migrant transit along the Central Mediterranean route, is 
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being carried out despite vocal opposition by an official at the African Union Delegation to the 
EU and by the Open Society European Policy Institute due to the risk of funneling vulnerable 
migrants into new smuggling networks and holding camps.111 
On the other hand, EU Commission officials in DG DEVCO argued that border security 
is not always a catalyst of human rights violations. 
 “Even border and security policy can have quite positive impact. Working on 
integrated border management is actually working for development and human 
rights because it actually helps goods and people to move better and more 
efficiently. It's not always negative, as long as it's done right and with the right 
objectives.” 112 
 
This argument presented at DG DEVCO brings us to the second cause for human rights 
concerns within issue-linkage: the EU’s alleged outsourcing of responsibility. The international 
NGO Human Rights Watch in fact argues that the EU Commission has crafted issue-linkage 
instruments for the realization of migration control objectives rather than the safeguard of human 
rights, the protection of migrants from smuggling networks, and the provision of safe channels 
and opportunities for asylum and economic migration. While many EU programs (such as the 
improvement of border security services) have “laudable goals if implemented properly,”113 
Human Rights Watch contends that linking EU foreign policy and aid to the external the 
stemming of irregular flows risks worsening the safeguard of human rights. In a November 2016 
report, Human Rights Watch admonished the EU’s lack of leadership and solidarity for human 
rights principles by not “sharing responsibility for them [asylum seekers and refugees] equitably” 
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and by endorsing policies designed to limit arrivals and outsource their management to countries 
outside the EU.114 
Presenting another human rights setback due to issue-linkage, the European Parliament 
criticized the Migration Partnership Framework for overshadowing the issues forced refugee 
displacement and human rights violations by pivoting its attention to economic migration.115 
Human Rights Watch also addresses the implications of issue-linkage’s focus on economic 
migration and asserts that: 
“Making development aid and EU foreign relations as a whole subservient 
to migration control objectives represents a sharp turn away from a forthright 
defense of human rights as a central plank of EU foreign policy, […] in ways that 
could ultimately prove self-defeating by failing to address the human rights abuse 
that often drive forced migration.”116 
 
 Overall, the arguments put forward by the European Parliament and Human Rights Watch 
show that the EU’s security priorities not only displace development goals within issue linkage 
(Section B), but also in affect cooperation efforts for migration management. This is reflected in 
the contested prioritization of the safeguard of human rights and of the provision of legal 
migration opportunities. 
 
7.3 Identification and Readmission Cooperation Efforts  
 
Lastly, both Senegalese officials and European officials cited the stagnation of the 
identification process for irregular migrants as a necessary point of improvement within short-																																																								
114 Human Rights Watch, (2016).  
115 European Parliament Development Committee Press Release, 25.01.2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170124IPR59772/meps-set-priorities-for-a-new-
impetus-in-development (accessed 05.02.2018) 
116 Human Rights Watch, (2016). 
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term cooperation relations. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement (the only EU hard law 
instrument governing migration management relations between the European Union and 79 
countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific) states the joint commitment of signatories to 
the return and readmission of irregular migrants.117 Issue-linkage instruments since the Valletta 
Summit aim to reinforce cooperation for returns and readmission. For example, under the 
Migration Partnership Framework, an identification mission of Senegalese officials was sent to 
both Italy and Belgium. The EU Delegation to Senegal cited the identification missions as a 
success indicator of the Migration Partnership Framework: “We were able to facilitate the 
sending of a delegation to Italy so that the Senegalese authorities could evaluate the conditions 
experienced by their citizens and provide support for their identification and repatriation to 
Senegal”. 118 However, the mixed results of both identification missions confounded the efficacy 
of using national delegations as rapid identification resources. The low numbers of Senegalese 
identifications underscore the need of a more comprehensive commitment by non-EU partner 
countries to identify their nationals.119 Released by the Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Table 4 details the countries that Senegalese citizens where repatriated from between January 
2017 and May 2017. The lack of Senegalese citizens repatriated from European countries is to be 
noted. An official at DG HOME declared,  “The results on irregular migration are not so brilliant 
to put it mildly.”120 
																																																								
117 Cotonou Agreement, Article 13, Section 5.C.2: 
“Each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are 
illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member State’s request 
and without further formalities. The Member States and the ACP States will provide their nationals with 
appropriate identity documents for such purposes”. 
118 Interview, EU Delegation to Senegal, Dakar, 22.05.2017  
119 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels 28.06.2017 and Interview, Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union External Relations, Rome, Italy, 
07.07.2017 
120 Interview, EU Commission, DG HOME, Brussels, 22.06.2017 
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Table 4. Readmissions of Senegalese Nationals, January-May 2017 
Month 
(2017) 
Number of repatriated 
citizens Origin 
January 87 Libya 
February 341 Libya 
March 427 279 Libya, 130 USA, 8 Mozambique 
April 137 113 Niger, 7 Libya, 17 Tunisia 
May 72 70 Libya, 2 Germany 
Total 1064  
Source: BAOS/DGSE, République du Sénégal, Ministère Des Affaires Estrangères et des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur 
 
 With regards to readmissions and repatriations, Italian officials at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs affirmed that the Italian government was treating repatriation negotiations very delicately 
and was exploring avenues for assisted voluntary returns in cooperation with international 
organizations such as UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and IOM 
(International Organization for Migration). 121  Furthermore, Italian officials stated that 
“Senegalese authorities use the narrative of forced returns a lot,” causing Italian and European 
authorities to treat bilateral readmission negotiations tactfully.122 Readmission efforts therefore 
continue to be a source of discord among EU representatives and non-EU partner countries. 
Conclusively, issue-linkage instruments have been ineffective so far in incentivizing cooperation 
for the processes of identification and readmission. As summarized by an official at the 
Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, “It is necessary to find the right equilibrium so that the focus is 
																																																								
121 Interview, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, DG European Union 
External Relations, Rome, 07.07.2017 
122 Interview, Italian Embassy to Senegal, Dakar, 26.05.2017 
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not exclusively on readmission and returns,” 123 for example through the effective centralization 
of legal migration and human rights within EU-Senegal migration management goals.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In Brussels’s BOZAR Amphitheater sat Franco-Senegalese writer Fatou Diome. It was 
June 2017, and she was presenting her newest book entitled Marianne Porte Plainte, an 
exploration of national identity within France’s political scene dominated by the rise of Marine 
Le Pen’s populist right-wing party Front National and its anti-immigration platform. With the 
sober tranquility of someone whose eyes have not been spared the realities of Europe’s 
xenophobic streets, workplaces, or talk shows, Ms Diome recounted her analysis of Senegalese, 
French, and EU policies in response to Europe’s migrant crisis. The Senegalese-born French 
national did not excuse any stakeholders in her call for cooperation and integration, ranging from 
the Senegalese government and EU policy makers, to humanitarian organizations and private 
citizens: “Globalism, however, is the defining fact of our century, and its corollary is mobility. In 
my crystal ball, what will make or break our era is the management of migrations”.124 
This article confirms that Ms Diome is correct in identifying the central role of migration 
management within international relations and within the future of EU domestic and external 
governance. I argue that the EU’s shift in rhetoric towards a supranational development agenda 
is hampered by the continued presence of an intergovernmental security bargaining framework 
among EU member states and within EU institutions.  
																																																								
123 Interview, Senegalese Embassy to Belgium, Brussels, 28.06.2017 
124 Diome F., Marianne Porte Plainte Book Presentation, Bozar Amphitheatre, Brussels, 18.06.2017 
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Starting off with the politicized insertion of migration into the EU’s external governance 
agenda, this article identified how the EU’s tapestry of soft law instruments and divergent 
institutional mandates produced a fragmented framework for the issue-linkage of migration and 
development and affected the EU’s working relationships with partner countries and institutions 
such as Senegal and the African Union. Using evidence from expert interviews, the research then 
determined that the EU’s push to interlace migration and development cooperation within a 
securitized cooperation framework has resulted in the displacement of development and 
migration management objectives.  
Firstly, in terms of development cooperation, the implications of issue-linkage at the 
micro-level of project management were that (1) resources were mostly displaced from 
development programs rather than increased, (2) committed resources were too small to make a 
difference, and (3) the financial instruments were not embedded in a long-term shared political 
vision. From a structural perspective, while EU actors rejected allegations of strict conditionality 
within issue-linkage, the broader development goals of the migration-development nexus were 
still undermined by the securitization of development programming and the disputed role of the 
EU as a development actor within non-EU partner countries. 
Secondly, in terms of migration management objectives, the prioritization of security 
concerns and narratives has prevented joint EU-Senegal progress on the two broader issues of 
legal migration and the safeguard of migrant human rights. Additionally, issue-linkage has not 
sufficiently incentivized short-term cooperation relations for identification and readmission 
efforts. 
Overall, the migration-development nexus in EU-Senegal relations is currently not being 
realized by issue-linkage instruments such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the 
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Migration Partnership Framework. The fragmentation of EU external governance, the 
securitization of migration management, and the EU’s disputed role as an agent for development 
in non-EU partner countries are all contributing factors to the inability of issue-linkage 
instruments to fulfill their stated goals. However, the research presented in this study’s literature 
review shows that the migration-development nexus can be a useful vehicle within an incomplete 
global governance framework to ensure that migration contributes to the economic and social 
development in countries of both migrant origin and destination. Furthermore, despite the 
identified divergence in European and Senegalese approaches to issue-linkage in terms of 
development as well as migration management goals, the research also highlighted the reciprocal 
recognition by all interviewed actors of the importance of cooperative relations in order to work 
towards the migration-development nexus. The flexible nature of issue-linkage instruments 
therefore generates both opportunities and risks for cooperation, undescoring the increased need 
of checks and balances to ensure that short-term EU and Senegalese security priorities and 
financial considerations do not overshadow the mandate of the migration-development nexus. 
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10. Appendixes  
 
Appendix A – Funding allocation to Senegal under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa  
EU Trust Fund for Africa mission statement: Prevent irregular migration and forced displacement and 
facilitate better migration management. Address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced 
persons in Africa 
EU Trust Fund for Africa - Senegal 
Total development funding: € 161.8 M   
- Economic opportunities - € 105.9 M  
- Return and reintegration - € 28 M  
- Migration management - € 27.9 M 
Project 
Number Project Title Implementing partners 
Allocated 
funding 
1 Developing employment opportunities in 
Senegal: re-enforcing the competitiveness of 
businesses and employability in areas of 
migration origin  
AFD - Agence Française de 
Développement  
 
€ 40 M  
 
2 Normalizing the living conditions of 
populations directly affected by the 
Casamance conflict 
ICRC - CICR - International 
Committee of the Red Cross  
 
€ 4,5 M  
 
3 PACERSEN: Projet d’Appui à la réduction de 
la migration à travers la Création d’Emplois 
Ruraux au Sénégal. 
Project to support the reduction of migration 
through the creation of rural employment in 
Senegal, facilitated by communal and 
individual agricultural farms in region of high 
emigration potential 
 
AECID - Agence Espagnole 
de Coopération 
Internationale au 
Développement, AICS - 
Italian Development 
Cooperation Agency  
€ 20 M  
 
4 PASPED – Programme de contraste à la 
migration illégale à travers l’appui au Secteur 
Privé et à la création d’emplois au Sénégal.  
Program to contrast irregular migration 
through the private sector and employment 
creation in Senegal 
CDP - Cassa depositi e 
prestiti Spa  
 
€ 14,3 M  
 
5 PARERBA – Projet d'Appui à la Réduction 
de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration 
dans le Bassin Arachidier  
BTC - CTB - Coopération 
Technique Belge  
 
€ 18 M  
 		
70 
Project to reduce rural emigration and 
increase re-integraition in the Bassin 
Arachidier region through the development of 
a rural economy along irrigation areas  
6 Project for the reinforcement of food and 
nutritional security in the Matam region 
ACTED - Agence d'Aide à la 
Coopération Technique et au 
Développement  
€ 1,1 M  
 
7 Resilience of vulnerable population in times 
of food and nutritional crisis in the areas of 
migrant origin Podor, Ranérou, Matam et 
Kanel  
AECID - Agence Espagnole 
de Coopération 
Internationale au 
Développement  
 
€ 8 M  
 
8 Re-enforcement of migration management 
and governance, the return and long-term 
reintegration of migrants to Senegal, and the 
facilitation of investments by the Senegalese 
diaspora 
  
IOM - International 
Organization for Migration, 
AFD - Agence Française de 
Développement, AECID - 
Agence Espagnole de 
Coopération Internationale 
au Développement  
€ 27,9 M  
9 Program in support of the re-enforcement of 
the civic information system and for the 
creation of a national biometric identification 
system 
CIVIPOL, BTC - CTB - 
Coopération Technique Belge  
 
€ 28 M  
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Appendix B – List of Expert Interviews Conducted, Governmental  
 
Senegalese Government Officials European Union Officials Italian Governement Officials 
Direction du Développement du 
Capital Humain - Ministère de 
l'Economie, des Finances, et du Plan  
(Dakar, Senegal) 
EU Delegation in Senegal 
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Italian Embassy to Senegal, 
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et 
des Sénégalaises a’ l’Exterieure  
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Irregular Migration and Return, 
DG HOME, EU Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
Italian Agency for Development 
and International Cooperation  
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Senegalese Embassy  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
Migration Management, DG 
HOME, EU Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
DG European Union External 
Relations, Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
(Rome – Italy) 
Senegalese Embassy to Italy 
(Rome, Italy) 
International Coordination A3, 
DG HOME, EU Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
DG International Cooperation for 
Migration, Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 
(Rome, Italy) 
African Union, Permanent 
representation to the European 
Union  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
Migration, Employment, 
Inequalities, DG DEVCO, EU 
Commission  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
Spain: AECID, Agencia Española 
de Cooperación Internacional para 
el Desarrollo 
(Dakar, Senegal) 
 West Africa Division, DG 
DEVCO, EU Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
 
 Senegal and The Gambia 
Division, European External 
Action Service, EU 
Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
 HRVP Federica Mogherini 
Cabinet, EU Commission 
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
 Development Committee,  
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European Parliament  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 EU Parliament, “High-Level 
Migration Management 
Conference”, 21 June 2017  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C – List of Expert Interviews Conducted, Non-Governmental  
 
Senegal, Non-Governmental European Union, Non-Governmental Italy, Non-Governmental 
Open Society Institute West Africa 
(Dakar, Senegal) 
European Policy Center  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
Associazione ANTIGONE 
(Rome, Italy) 
Ecole Normale Superieure, FASTEF, 
Université Cheikh Anta Diop  
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Open Society European Policy 
Institute  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
Rencontre Africain pour la Défense 
des Droits de l'Homme and the West 
African Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons Network  
(Dakar, Senegal) 
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace  
(Brussels, Belgium) 
 
Institut Fondamental de l’Afrique 
Noire, Université Cheikh Anta Diop 
(Dakar, Senegal) 
  
 
 
 
